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Abstract: 
As well as the current one, the wave of globalization culminated in 1913 was marked by 
increasing accumulation of foreign exchange reserves. But what did ‘reserves’ mean in the 
past, how were they managed, and how much relevant are the differences between then and 
now? This paper is the first attempt to investigate 19th-century reserve management from 
central banks’ perspective. Building on a significant case study (the National Bank of 
Belgium, i.e. the ‘inventor’ of foreign exchange policy, in the 1850s), it shows that risk 
management practices in the past differed considerably from nowadays. The structure of the 
international monetary system allowed central banks to minimize financial risk, while poor 
institutional design enhanced operational risk: this is in stark contrast with the present 
situation, in which operational risk has been minimized and financial risk has considerably 
increased. Yet 19th-century reserve management was apparently not conducive to major losses 
for central banks, while the opposite seems to have been the case in the 21st century. 
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Introduction 
One of the most interesting aspects of the monetary action of peripheral countries during 
the gold standard era consists of their widespread adoption of foreign exchange policies, 
which turned the international monetary system into a de facto gold-exchange standard by the 
end of the 19th century.2 As much as the current one, the first wave of globalization was thus 
accompanied by increasing accumulation of foreign reserves. This striking parallelism is 
fascinating, and economists might be legitimately tempted to look for insights from the past. 
There are at least two dimensions along which such an exercise can be performed. One 
concerns the motives for accumulation and the relative role of reserve currencies in the 
structure of the international monetary system: for instance, which lessons for the dollar’s 
current position might be drawn from sterling’s past performance? These questions, which 
bear a lot of relevance from a macroeconomic viewpoint, have already started to be 
approached by the literature.3 An alternative dimension concerns the practicalities of the 
accumulation process: what were reserves made of in the 19th century, how were they actually 
managed at the time, and do the differences between now and then have something to teach 
us? These questions, which are particularly interesting from a microeconomic viewpoint, have 
never been addressed up to now: as a matter of fact, very few elements about the practical 
aspects of foreign exchange policy have emerged so far.4 Given the relatively low level of 
disclosure associated with these activities, details remain largely unknown even for the case 
of today’s central banks; concerning the past, most crucial elements are still buried in archives 
– if not lost forever. 
This chapter is the first attempt to look specifically at foreign exchange reserve 
management practices in the 19th century. It is based on fresh archival research covering a 
particularly relevant case study: the National Bank of Belgium (i.e. the first central bank to 
engage massively into foreign exchange policy) during its first years of operation (1851-3). 
Of course, the aim is not to provide an exhaustive description of 19th-century reserve 
management practices – still an impossible task given the current state of research. Rather, the 
idea is to provide a preliminary assessment of the complexity of foreign portfolio 
management in the past, its differences with today, and the implications of such differences. 
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The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. The first section provides the 
interpretative framework for this study and summarizes recent trends in reserve management 
practices. The second section introduces the structure of 19th-century international payments 
systems and financial intermediation. The third and fourth sections focus on the Belgian case 
study, looking at the management of financial and operational risk respectively. The chapter 
ends with conclusions. 
 
Foreign Exchange Reserve Management in the 21st Century: An 
Introduction 
Although a number of different reasons for holding reserves can be found, all of them 
ensue from the wish to sterilize some current or future capital movement.5 In order to be able 
to pursue this aim in a sustainable way, central banks have always oriented their foreign 
portfolio management towards the reconciliation of two potentially conflicting targets: 
liquidity (the ability to dismiss reserves easily at any moment) and profitability (the ability to 
receive an adequate remuneration for the capital allocated to reserves). If one is to study the 
dynamics of such portfolio choices, it is convenient to adopt the viewpoint of central bankers 
and look at them as risk management practices. Risk involved in foreign reserve management 
takes the form of financial and operational risk. On the one hand, the financial risk associated 
with a given security is defined as composed by credit risk (the risk that the payments linked 
to the security will be defaulted), market risk (the risk that the value of the security will 
decrease due to aggregate market factors), and liquidity risk (the risk that the security will not 
be exchangeable quickly enough to avoid a loss). On the other hand, the operational risk 
associated with a given transaction is defined as the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or 
failed internal processes. Throughout the chapter, this useful framework will be adopted in 
order to compare past and current practices. 
Starting from the present, it must be acknowledged that details on nowadays’ foreign 
reserve management do not abound. One of the most useful available sources consists of a 
2007 survey conducted by the Bank for International Settlements.6 Concerning the 
management of financial risk, the report argues that a new trend has emerged since the 1980s. 
Before that decade, central banks used to hold reserves in highly-liquid and safe assets, such 
as gold, bank deposits, Treasury bills, and sovereign bonds. Concern about the social cost of 
dramatically increasing foreign reserves, however, has nurtured a more profit-oriented attitude 
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towards reserve management. This has also been encouraged by the idea that financial 
innovation had been enhancing the liquidity of riskier securities, thus transforming them into 
proper instruments for central bank investment. As a result, the list of asset classes included in 
official portfolios has expanded, to include instruments of much longer maturity than before – 
such as agency paper, mortgage-backed securities, corporate debt, and even equities.7 This 
expansion has also produced changes in the management of operational risk. While decision 
about the ‘philosophy’ of investment has been left to top executives, practical management 
has progressively been split among a multitude of specialized agents, and sometimes even 
outsourced to external managers. This horizontal separation has been implemented with the 
aim of limiting opportunities for conflicts of interest, but also of shielding monetary 
authorities from criticism associated with specific choices.8 
Nowadays’ foreign reserve management differs from the 19th-century one from the 
viewpoint of both the instruments involved and the organization of operations. As suggested 
by the next section, this is tied to crucial dissimilarities in the structure of the international 
payments system and of international financial intermediation. 
 
Foreign Exchange Reserve Management in the 19th Century: An 
Introduction 
At a time when most countries adhered to some kind of convertibility rule (gold, silver, or 
bimetallic standard), central banks were required to maintain their banknotes payable in 
bullion. In such a framework, it is impossible to qualify gold and silver holdings as ‘foreign 
reserves’ properly speaking: as a matter of fact, bullion used to be legal tender and could thus 
be employed in order to broaden or shrink the domestic monetary base. In what follows, 
therefore, gold and silver will not be considered as instruments for foreign reserve 
accumulation. 
In the 19th century, the term ‘foreign exchange’ was used as a synonym to the market price 
of a particular asset class: bills of exchange payable on a foreign place.9 Bills of exchange (or, 
as they later came to be known, acceptances) were negotiable promissory notes with multiple 
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guarantees: bound to be paid at maturity by one person (the acceptor) who had agreed to 
certify the quality of the original debtor (the drawer), they were also secured by the signatures 
of all the people who had previously held and resold them (the endorsers).10 Due to their 
particular convenience in bridging the information asymmetries associated with overseas 
transactions, bills of exchange had become the staple instrument for international payments 
since the early modern age. Of course, the system was not fully exempt from abuses: for 
instance, the so-called ‘cross-firing’ (the mutual drawing and accepting of two bills of the 
same amount by two colluding agents) constituted a typical refinancing device that de facto 
annihilated the value of the guarantees.11 Moreover, multiple guarantees could also become a 
dangerous vehicle of contagion during crises.12 Yet despite these downsides, the system had 
nonetheless proved basically resilient to major shocks over the centuries. The primacy of bills 
as the most liquid asset class available to investors was definitively established in the 1850s, 
when a considerable expansion and deepening of the markets for these securities took place. 
This was tied to two interconnected phenomena: the spectacular growth in world trade and 
finance, and the general introduction of lending-of-last-resort facilities by central banks.13 As 
a result, acceptances became unrivalled as the most suitable instrument for the placement of 
foreign reserves.14 
Bills of exchange entered almost all kinds of portfolios, being bought (or ‘discounted’) by 
specialized money market funds (known as discount houses), by commercial banks, by 
private investors, etc. The most active players in the origination of bills, however, were 
concentrated in a specific segment of the banking sector: private investment banks known as 
merchant banks. Merchant banks were trading houses which had gradually specialized in 
finance. Owing to their original business activities, they had established those multinational 
networks of correspondents which constituted the necessary condition for performing 
accepting on a broad scale.15 Yet merchant banks did not only originate bills: they also 
performed a number of services for their customers (e.g. the encashment of coupons or of 
bills originated by other houses), took deposits, operated on the bullion market, and 
underwrote bonds and equities. Towards the end of the 19th century, the successful model of 
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merchant banking was increasingly imitated by multinational joint-stock banks – some of 
which (as e.g. Paribas: see below) were former merchant houses evolved into universal banks. 
Seconded by technological improvements (viz. the introduction of telegraphic transfers), these 
new intermediaries started to offer more competitive forms of deposits to their customers. 
Despite their inherently higher riskiness,16 these new types of claims would eventually 
outperform bills as the favourite instrument for the placement foreign reserves – albeit not 
before the interwar period.17 Because of the variety of services they offered to their 
customers, foreign merchant banks were by far the most convenient agents with which 19th-
century central banks could interact in order to manage reserves. By contrast, relationships 
with other banks of issue were extremely rare: foreign reserves were almost never kept in the 
form of deposits with other monetary institutions.18 Contacts between central banks were 
generally scanty: some information was exchanged concerning very technical issues (e.g. 
counterfeiting or bookkeeping practices),19 but even direct transactions between monetary 
authorities (e.g. bullion swaps) were performed through the intermediation of merchant 
banks.20 As a matter of fact, foreign reserve management remained something to be fully 
undisclosed to those monetary authorities which would suffer from the pressure of reserve 
liquidations during crises. 
 
Financial Risk in 19th-Century Foreign Reserve Management: The Belgian 
Case 
Since the very beginning of its operations, the National Bank of Belgium (hereafter NBB) 
engaged heavily into foreign exchange policy. This depended on the need to reconcile a 
formal mandate to maintain convertibility with an informal one to stabilize domestic interest 
rates. In order to pursue these conflicting aims, the Bank started to perform open market 
operations on a massive scale, which resulted in the accumulation of huge foreign reserves.21  
Both the NBB’s primacy in foreign exchange policy and the breadth of its operations 
(covering up to six currencies at the time) make the Bank an ideal candidate for a case study 
on 19th-century foreign reserve management practices. To perform a detailed microeconomic 
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analysis, this chapter makes use of a high-frequency database covering the Bank’s first three 
years of operation (January 1851 to December 1853).22 
Asset Class Composition 
In order to analyse the NBB’s management of financial risk, the first step consists of 
investigating the asset class composition of the portfolio. Figure 1 shows that only two types 
of instruments were held by the Bank: bills of exchange payable abroad, and deposits with 
foreign banks. While deposits dominated in the very beginning (when the Bank’s network 
was in its setting-up phase), their share shrank rapidly: in 1852-3, bills of exchange exceeded 
85% of the total portfolio on average. 
Figure 2 gives data in absolute numbers and provides details on bills and deposits held in 
each of the six currencies the Bank was dealing with.23 It is possible to see that, as a general 
rule, deposits only constituted a residual part of portfolio management operations: they 
typically remained close to zero, and tended to increase temporarily in periods when the Bank 
was diminishing its holdings in that given currency.24 On the whole, figure 2 testifies the role 
of the bill of exchange as the staple instrument of the NBB’s foreign reserve management.25 
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Figure 1: Composition of foreign reserves per asset class, 1851-3 
 
Source: author. 
 
Figure 2: Composition of foreign reserves, 1851-3 (in Belgian francs) 
 
Source: author. 
 
9 
Purchasing and Dismissing Reserves: Strategies 
The previous paragraph has looked at the choice between bills and deposits as instruments 
for placing a given amount of a foreign currency. But which techniques did the NBB 
implement in order to modify the size or the currency composition of its foreign portfolio?26 
As a matter of fact, a variety of choices were available to the Bank in order to buy or sell a 
given currency, depending on the place on which it wished to operate: 
- First, the Bank could operate on the onshore market of the currency (say, 
London for sterling). Here, local currency could be exchanged against bullion (1a), 
against bills in Belgian francs (1b), against bills in third currencies (say, French 
francs; 1c), or against claims on foreign banks (say, a transfer on a Paris house; 1d). 
- Second, the Bank could operate on the offshore market for that currency in 
Belgium (say, the Antwerp market for sterling). Here, the given foreign currency 
could be exchanged against Belgian francs at the bourse and at the NBB counters 
(2a);27 in alternative, the conversion could be implemented through direct transactions 
with Belgian banks (2b) or the Treasury (2c). 
- Third, the Bank could operate on a third offshore market for that currency (say, 
the Paris market for sterling). Here, the given currency (sterling) could be exchanged 
against local currency (French francs) either in the form of bills (3a) or in the form of 
claims on local banks (3b). 
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Table 1: Total amount of operations implying a modification in the composition (grey) or in 
the size and composition (white) of the foreign portfolio, 1851-3 (in million Belgian francs) 
Purchases of 
Foreign 
Assets 
Sales of 
Foreign 
Assets 
1) on Their 
Onshore Market 
(with Foreign Banks) 
1a) against Bullion      17.4      19.8  
1b) against Bills in Belgian Francs 
                           
-       10.7  
1c) against Bills in Third Currencies        3.5      37.9  
1d) against Claims on Foreign Banks 
                         
-          4.2  
2) on the Offshore 
Market in Belgium 
(against Belgian Francs) 
2a) with the General Public      82.2         5.3  
2b) with Belgian Banks      12.8      38.4  
2c) with the Treasury 
            
-       14.1  
3) on Third 
Offshore Markets 
(with Foreign Banks) 
3a) against Bills in Third Currencies      37.9         3.5  
3b) against Claims on Foreign Banks      4.2  
                           
-   
TOTAL   158.0    133.9  
Source: author. 
 
Of course, not all operations had the same effects on reserves: operations involving bullion 
or Belgian francs (1a, 1b, 2a, 2b, 2c) implied a change in the composition and size of the 
portfolio, while swaps of foreign currencies (1c, 1d, 3a, 3b) entailed a change in its 
composition only. Table 1 gives the total amounts transacted for each class of operations in 
1851-3.28 The data show that increasing and decreasing reserves were not symmetric 
operations. When the NBB wished to acquire foreign assets, it most often resorted to the 
Belgian offshore market (52% of total purchases for operation 2a, 8% for 2c) or to other 
offshore markets (38% for 3a); rather surprisingly, the Bank seldom purchased new 
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currencies on their own onshore market – and when it did so, it mainly employed bullion 
(11% for 1a). The picture was quite different in case the NBB wished to dismiss foreign 
assets. The Belgian offshore market still played an important role, but different agents were 
most often involved (mainly domestic banks: 29% of total sales for operation 2b, and the 
Treasury: 10% for 2c),29 while the general public was seldom concerned (only 4% for 2a). 
The onshore market of the given currency was now the main playground of operation (28% 
for 1c, 15% for 1a, and 8% for 1b), while third offshore markets were almost neglected (only 
2% for 3a). 
The NBB’s asymmetric behaviour in the reshuffling of its foreign portfolio provides 
insights on both market structure and policy aims. First, it suggests that on mid-19th-century 
offshore foreign exchange markets, transaction costs (mainly connected with the bills’ 
encashment procedures) were spread unevenly along the maturity curve: as the Bank 
purchased securities of longer maturity than the ones it sold, it was apparently cheaper for it 
to operate in offshore markets when it bought long bills than when it sold short ones. Second, 
it conveys the idea that offshore markets for the Belgian franc outside Belgium (on which the 
Bank almost never operated) were far less liquid than offshore markets for other currencies in 
Belgium: this can be interpreted as evidence of the juniority of the franc with respect to the 
main international currencies in the early 1850s.30 Third, it points to the fact that bank 
transfers (that the NBB seldom used) were still fairly unpractical means of payments with 
respect to exchange-traded bills. Finally, it confirms that the bulk of the Bank’s operations 
were not dictated by monetary policy aims: the most systemically important kind of 
transaction, i.e. the purchase of bullion abroad (1a), barely represented 15% of total reserve 
dismissals.31 
Credit Risk 
The previous paragraph has illustrated the techniques available to the NBB in order to 
modify the composition of its foreign portfolio. But what about the motives for 
diversification? The currency composition of the Bank’s reserves was very volatile because it 
was almost exclusively driven by profitability concerns.32 This suggests that financial risk 
was dealt with in a rather easy way by the Bank. The previous section argued that liquidity 
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risk associated with bills of exchange was kept low by their role as staple international means 
of payment, and that credit risk was moderated by the multiple-guarantee system. Still, how 
did such system work in practice? 
While the amounts of foreign bills to be purchased were set by the Administration Board, 
the screening of the securities entering the NBB’s portfolio had to be made by the bodies 
forming the Bank’s own network. In case the foreign bill was discounted at one of the NBB’s 
counters in Belgium, the security was always endorsed by one of the Bank’s usual customers 
and thus bore his guarantee: as a result, the risk on these bills was governed by the same rules 
concerning the purchase of domestic bills.33 In case the foreign bill was discounted abroad by 
a correspondent, though, the problem was different: as a matter of fact, the Bank had to 
delegate completely the screening of ‘signatures’ to external agents located abroad. To solve 
this problem, all correspondents were asked to endorse themselves the bills they remitted to 
Brussels – i.e. to guarantee the Bank against possible defaults by the acceptors of the bills.34 
As a result, credit risk associated with foreign bills was almost non-existent, except in case of 
a default by a correspondent. As the latter case would more properly figure under the heading 
of operational risk, it will be dealt with in the next section. 
Market Risk and the International Monetary System 
According to what has been said so far, only market risk was a real matter of concern 
within the Bank’s foreign reserve management. Because of the self-liquidating nature of bills 
(which were automatically turned into cash at maturity), market risk mainly resulted from 
exchange rate volatility (i.e. currency risk).35 
The six foreign currencies in which the NBB used to operate were all convertible into 
bullion: most of them, like the Belgian franc, into silver – except the British pound (which 
was convertible into gold) and the French franc (into silver or gold). Conversely, investing in 
inconvertible currencies was never considered as a viable option by the Bank.36 As a result, 
currency risk was determined by the credibility of convertibility commitments and the 
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27th February 1851, 14th and 30th August 1851). That is why the Austrian currency area is included in figure 3. 
13 
stability of the international monetary system. Because the latter proved remarkable in the 
1850s notwithstanding a number of exogenous shocks,37 the Bank had the chance to modify 
aggressively portfolio composition without increasing considerably the exposition to financial 
risk. 
Some considerations about the coeval international monetary system are in order. To be 
able to diversify its reserves, the Bank established a network of corresponding banks in the 
main financial centres of each currency area. Because it was the correspondents’ task to take 
care of the encashment of maturing bills, from the Bank’s viewpoint foreign securities were 
always payable in one of these six centres – where correspondents would turn them into cash. 
Yet this does not mean that all the bills in the NBB’s portfolio were accepted by merchant 
banks established in these six cities: provided that they were denominated in the desired 
currency, bills could well be payable on other places. The fact that the NBB systematically 
kept record of where its bills were payable (IC 1851-3) allows to reconstruct the monetary 
geography of the 1850s – a period in which the making of ‘territorial money’ was still an 
ongoing process.38 This is done in figure 3, where the names of the financial centres quoted 
by NBB sources are reported. Three interesting features emerge from the picture. First, the 
Latin Monetary Union was a matter of fact long before the 1865 Convention officially 
established it: despite the fact that the uniformity of specie circulation within the franc area 
was disintegrating in the early 1850s,39 Paris apparently remained the main money market for 
the whole region.40 Second, albeit the amount of thaler-denominated bills bought by the NBB 
was small (see figure 2), their geographical origin was remarkably diversified: this conveys 
the idea that Berlin was still a relatively underdeveloped money market in the 1850s, and that 
its later primacy over other German centres was a consequence of the Unification.41 Third, 
notwithstanding the fact that the mark banco was the official unit of account of the Free City 
of Hamburg only, mark-denominated bills were accepted by merchant banks located in other 
countries too (i.e. in Altona, Copenhagen, and Christiania): this suggests that at least the 
export-oriented portion of the Scandinavian banking systems was keeping its books in foreign 
instead of local currency – a phenomenon analogous to nowadays’ dollarization.42 
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 This is confirmed by the fact that all purchases of Belgian francs implemented by the NBB outside Belgium 
(i.e. operation 1b in table 1) were actually performed in Paris – which means that the city hosted the only liquid 
offshore market for the Belgian franc. 
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 This is also reflected by the fact that the Swedish Riksbank reacted to the 1857 crisis by originating mark-
denominated bills: Ögren, A. (2007). 
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Figure 3: Monetary geography in the 1850s, as emerging from the NBB’s bill portfolio 
management. Seven main currency areas are highlighted: 1) franc (main financial centre: 
Paris), 2) sterling (London), 3) Dutch guilder (Amsterdam), 4) mark banco (Hamburg), 5) 
South-German guilder (Frankfurt), 6) thaler (Berlin), 7) Austrian guilder (Vienna)  
 
Source: IC 1851-3, and Lemale, A. (1875). 
Profitability 
The previous paragraph has argued that financial risk associated with foreign bills only 
depended on market (read, currency) risk, which was rather low in the 1850s despite the 
turbulent character of that decade.43 The way for testing this claim consists of looking at ex-
post profitability. It is a particularly unfortunate circumstance that, by systematically merging 
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domestic and foreign assets, the NBB’s books do not allow for a precise assessment of the 
profitability of foreign reserves. Nonetheless, the annual reports to shareholders published by 
the Bank (RAG) contain a number of interesting elements, which are used in this paragraph in 
order to draw some conclusions. 
Table 2: Gross profit of discount activities and loss on rediscount and exchange, 1851-3 (in 
thousand Belgian francs) 
  1851 1852 1853 
Gross profit of discount activities 823.6 1,496.2 1,269.9 
Loss on rediscount and exchange 136.0 113.3 178.1 
NET 687.6 1,382.8 1,091.8 
Source: RAG 1851-3. 
The NBB was a profitable joint-stock company: the yearly return to capital for 
shareholders was equal to 7.25% in 1851, 13.40% in 1852, and 13.32% in 1853. Discount 
activities contributed substantially to profit generation (57.23% of total profits generated in 
1851, 52.67% in 1852, and 64.45% in 1853).44 On the one hand, some elements on credit risk 
for discount activities are given by the amount of unpaid bills, which always equalled zero in 
1851-3. On the other hand, some elements on market risk for discount activities are given by 
the losses made on rediscount and exchange (see table 2):45 as the NBB never resold on the 
open market the domestic bills it had previously discounted, the numbers only refer to foreign 
bills. It is possible to see that market risk had non-negligible effects in two turbulent years 
(1851 and 1853), yet much lower ones in a quiet year (1852).46 This depends on the fact that, 
in times of disturbances, the Bank could find itself bound to liquidate reserves regardless of 
eventual losses. 
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 These numbers include the remuneration of deposits by foreign correspondents – i.e. the other way than 
discount through which foreign reserves were made profitable. 
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 ‘Losses on rediscount’ consist of the difference between the discount margin at which the Bank had bought 
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at which it resold them on the market: these are losses associated with currency risk. 
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 In 1853 (the only year for which details are available), losses from rediscount and exchange amounted to 21% 
of total gross profits from discount of foreign bills. 
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Figure 4: Monthly gross product of discounting (in Belgian francs), 1853 
 
Source: RAG 1851-3. 
Still, what was the actual contribution of foreign reserves to profit generation? On average, 
in 1851-3 the NBB’s foreign bill portfolio was only slightly larger than the domestic bill 
portfolio.47 But were foreign exchange operations as profitable as domestic ones? RAG only 
provides some elements for the year 1853. Figure 4 shows that the gross product of discount 
for foreign bills was predominant during most of that year. For the same period, figure 5 
compares the average gross profitability of discount operations on a currency basis.48 On the 
whole, foreign operations were generally (but not always) slightly more profitable than 
domestic ones. This confirms the impression that low financial risk was associated with these 
monetary instruments. 
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 Note that numbers in figure 5 do not represent yields, as the maturity of bills discounted is unknown. The 
figure gives the ratio of gross profits from discount to the volumes discounted. Albeit not a yield, this is a 
significant indicator anyway. As the treatment of bills implied a number of fixed costs, it was preferable for the 
Bank to hold bills of longer maturity (although not exceeding ninety days). In the case of open-window 
discounts of domestic bills, that Bank could not choose the maturity of the securities it purchased: as a result, the 
average maturity of its domestic portfolio tended to be shorter than its foreign portfolio. All other things equal, 
this meant a lower profitability of domestic operations with respect to foreign ones. Shorter maturity of bills is 
reflected by a lower ratio of gross profits to the volume discounted – as shown by figure 5. 
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Figure 5: Monthly ratio of gross profits from discount to total volumes discounted per 
currency, 1853 
 
Source: RAG 1853. 
Financial Risk Management: Sum-Up 
The structure of financial risk associated with foreign bills of exchange was considerably 
different than the one associated with domestic bills. Liquidity risk was basically non-existent 
for foreign bills (which could be easily sold in the open market, backed by the rediscounting 
facilities of a foreign central bank), while it was a real concern for domestic ones (which 
could not be resold by the domestic central bank itself). Credit risk was also rather low for 
foreign bills (at least, as long as the guarantee supplied by correspondents was effective), 
while it was much higher for domestic bills (as shown by the losses the Bank would suffer 
from domestic defaults some years later).49 On the contrary, market risk was non-existent for 
domestic bills, while it was non-negligible for foreign ones: mainly originating from 
exchange rate volatility, this risk was nevertheless not much sizeable in a stable international 
fixed-exchange-rate regime. On the whole, it is possible to conclude that the nature of the 
19th-century international monetary system and of the credit instruments associated with it 
allowed for the maintenance of a remarkably low amount of financial risk in foreign reserve 
management. 
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Operational Risk in 19th-Century Foreign Reserve Management: The 
Belgian Case 
The fact that the NBB did not suffer losses from insider practices on foreign reserves does 
not mean that the Bank was actually not exposed to operational risk during the period of our 
concern. The structure of decision-making related to foreign reserves assigned to the 
Administration Board the power to decide how many bills would be discounted by each 
member of the Bank’s network, and to the correspondents the power to decide which bills 
would be discounted. As said, credit risk on foreign bills was non-existent only as long as the 
guarantee supplied by correspondents was not a matter of doubt. This means that the NBB 
was exposed to moral hazard with respect to its network. As a matter of fact, a misbehaving 
correspondent might have taken advantage of its role as delegated screener for selling to the 
Bank low-quality assets at the price of first-order ones. Worse than that, the correspondent 
was in the position to make the Bank discount speculative-grade bills originated by himself 
(by ‘cross-firing’ with colluding agents): in other words, instead of acting as a mere 
intermediary, the correspondent had the opportunity of using the NBB in order to refinance 
himself at a cheaper rate than the market rate.50 In view of this all, an accurate selection of the 
members of the network proved the keystone of the Bank’s risk management. This choice was 
entirely delegated to the Administration Board: collusion between the Board and 
correspondents, therefore, would be conducive to agency problems. As a result, the way for 
assessing the Bank’s exposition to operational risk consists of reviewing the selection 
procedure of external agents. In case the procedure were implemented in an unbiased way, 
one would expect the NBB to look for the intermediaries bearing the best reputation in each 
foreign place – viz., those for which the opportunity cost of misbehaving (i.e. losing 
reputation) was the highest. Was this actually always the case? 
Structure of the Network 
As said, the NBB needed to implement transactions in six European financial centres: in 
order to do this, a regular correspondent was chosen in each of these places. Regular 
correspondents were the ones with which the Bank also kept deposits. However, the NBB 
often happened to accomplish some occasional operations, in the same places where it had 
regular correspondents, through other agents. This means that regular correspondents did not 
hold a monopoly of financial intermediation (on the Bank’s account) in their own place: the 
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NBB could resort to competitors in order to be granted better conditions. No deposits were 
kept with these occasional correspondents: as no continuity existed, operations were financed 
one by one. For the reasons illustrated above, all foreign correspondents were chosen among 
merchant banks. 
Table 3 gives the total amount of bills (including renewals) discounted by each component 
of the NBB’s network in 1851-3. While discounting of foreign bills in Belgium constituted 
the most popular way for accumulating new reserves (see table 1), renewals of maturing bills 
abroad drove most of the volume of all discounting activities. The bulk of the business was 
conducted by regular correspondents, but occasional ones also played an important role. As 
correspondents were remunerated only on the basis of fees on discounting (encashment of 
maturing bills was made for free), a larger volume of discounts meant higher remuneration for 
the corresponding agent. While on some places the Bank only resorted to one single agent, on 
some others business was split to different competing houses – especially in the case of Paris, 
where the regular correspondent (De Rothschild Frères) only covered 70% of total operations. 
Table 3: Total purchases of foreign bills per correspondent, 1851-3 (in million Belgian 
francs) 
Antwerp 34.7 
Brussels and Provinces 47.5 
Total NBB Counters 82.2 
De Rothschild Frères (Paris) 78.3 
Bischoffsheim & Goldschmidt (London) 96.5 
Determeyer Weslingh en Zoon (Amsterdam) 38.3 
Salomon Heine (Hamburg) 48.7 
Benedikt Hayum Goldschmidt (Frankfurt) 15.1 
Mendelssohn-Bartholdy und Kompagnie (Berlin) 25.1 
Total Regular Correspondents 302.0 
Bischoffsheim, Goldschmidt et Cie (Paris) 14.6 
Fould et Fould-Oppenheim (Paris) 17.6 
Noël, Page et Cie (Paris) 0.7 
Nathan Mayer Rothschild & Sons (London) 9.0 
Ludwig Raphael Bischoffsheim (Amsterdam) 1.9 
Mayer Amschel von Rothschild und Söhne (Frankfurt) 1.8 
Total Occasional Correspondents 45.6 
TOTAL 429.8 
Source: author. 
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Selection of Correspondents: Facts 
Table 3 allows to perform the test proposed at the beginning of this section. Together with 
long-established, first-order merchant banks (such as the Rothschild, Fould, Determeyer, 
Heine, or Mendelssohn houses), the list of the Bank’s correspondents also included a number 
of less reputed agents – most notably the London, Paris, Amsterdam, and Frankfurt branches 
of the Bischoffsheim-Goldschmidt group. Except perhaps the Frankfurt one, the 
Bischoffsheim houses were recently established, relatively small, and with a rather bad 
reputation.51 Given that these agents were much more exposed to the temptation of 
misbehaving, why did the NBB put itself in a potentially dangerous position? 
The members of the body in charge of the selection of correspondents (the Directors) had 
mostly been chosen among the former administrators of Banque de Belgique, a joint-stock 
commercial bank which held 60% of the NBB’s capital. All Directors were local businessmen 
with a strictly domestic orientation, except one: the merchant banker Jonathan-Raphaël 
Bischoffsheim, head of the Brussels branch of the Bischoffsheim-Goldschmidt group.52 The 
minutes of the Board show that the choice of the Bank’s correspondents produced tensions 
between the merchant banker (who tried to favour his own group) and the representatives of 
minority stakeholders (who pushed for the leading merchant banks of the time, and especially 
for the house of Rothschild).53 
Because of its small size and poor reputation, the Bischoffsheim group was inadequate to 
supply the Bank with the whole range of services it needed. This was particularly clear in the 
case of Paris. In the event of crises, the NBB needed to import quickly from France huge 
amounts of silver coins in order to maintain convertibility;54 in view of the crucial function it 
played, the Bank’s correspondent in Paris had to be able to guarantee the immediate 
conversion of reserves into species. No bank could credibly commit to insure this large-scale 
supply except the house of Rothschild, the leading operator on international bullion markets – 
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as well as the monopolistic supplier of this kind of services to central banks.55 This explains 
why De Rothschild Frères was the only correspondent with which the NBB had large (and 
exceptionally, remunerated) deposits. As a result, competition with the Rothschild group on 
this field was clearly out of question for the Bischoffsheims. 
What the Bischoffsheims could (and did) do, instead, was ‘dumping’ their competitors – 
viz., offering slightly better prices for the purchase of foreign bills. This was easy, as the 
bankers operated on a different segment of the bill market than their competitors. As a matter 
of fact, bills were not uniform instruments: as the quality of each asset was determined by the 
signatures impressed on them (acceptor and endorsers), plenty of different discount rates 
(corresponding to each quality class) were in force at any moment on the bill market.56 Not 
being considered as first-order securities, bills bearing the Bischoffsheims’ signature were 
discounted on the market at higher rates than those bearing the guarantee of more reputed 
houses. In normal conditions, the NBB would have abstained from purchasing second-order 
securities; but the presence of a family member on the Board did matter. Thanks to Jonathan-
Raphaël’s lobbying, the Bank was induced to consider the quality of Bischoffsheim-
guaranteed bills as high as (say) Rothschild-guaranteed ones. Given this, it was easy for the 
Bischoffsheims to discount on behalf of the Bank at a higher rate than the one offered by the 
Rothschilds without reducing their profit margins, because the rate proposed to the NBB was 
still lower than the rate at which the very same bills were discounted on the market. But not 
only were the Bischoffsheims able to make extra profits on intermediation; they also were in 
the position to refinance themselves at particularly advantageous conditions. By directly 
originating bills then resold to the NBB at a higher price than the market one, the group was 
given the chance of growing much more leveraged at relatively low cost. 
Table 4: Total purchases of foreign bills per group of correspondents, 1851-3 (in million 
Belgian francs) 
NBB Counters 82.2 
Rothschild Group 89.1 
Bischoffsheim-Goldschmidt Group 128.1 
Other Foreign Correspondents 130.4 
TOTAL 429.8 
Source: author. 
Thanks to their access to insider information, the Bischoffsheim houses regularly 
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approached the Board to offer more advantageous conditions than their competitors: in this 
way, they managed to secure a good portion of the Bank’s business in Paris – and this, despite 
the fact that the Rothschilds had explicitly asked to be granted the monopoly of operation on 
that place.57 As shown by table 4, the Bischoffsheim group finally managed to appropriate a 
large slice of the Bank’s foreign business in 1851-3. The main contribution to this success 
came from Jonathan-Raphaël’s ability to secure for his family the role of regular 
correspondents for the sterling area. Managing the NBB’s large business, the newly-
established Bischoffsheim-Goldschmidt house abruptly became an important player on the 
London discount market: this is illustrated by figure 6, where the volumes discounted on 
behalf of the NBB are compared with those discounted by the most important player of all 
(the Bank of England). By rapidly acquiring market power in the core financial centre of the 
time, and by acquiring the possibility of refinancing on a vast scale at cheaper rates than 
market ones, the group set the foundations for its emergence as a leading international actor – 
which would eventually occur under the unified label of Paribas, the joint-stock bank merging 
the Bischoffsheims’ concerns in the 1870s.58 
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Figure 6: Weekly amounts discounted by Bischoffsheim & Goldschmidt on behalf of the NBB 
on the London market, compared with the amounts discounted by the Bank of England (in 
British pounds), 1851-3 
 
Sources: author, and BoE C28/11-3. 
Operational Risk Management: Concluding Remarks 
The NBB’s foreign reserve management practices opened scope for patent conflicts of 
interests to occur: the personal links between insiders and correspondents exposed the Bank to 
agency problems. Although the overall success of the Bischoffsheim group (thereafter 
Paribas) gradually increased the opportunity cost (and hence decreased the probability) of 
misbehaving, the NBB would have certainly suffered significant losses in case the 
Bischoffsheims’ screening practices and guarantees had proven to be dubious. But there is 
more: echoing coeval criticism (see e.g. RAG 1856), one may wonder if the incentive 
structure embedded in such conflicts of interests was not pushing the Bank towards an 
excessive foreign discount activity. The question may be reformulated as follows: was the 
level of cash surplus targeted by the Board fully appropriate, or was it set too low due to a 
bias towards accumulating foreign reserves?59 Although the issue is impossible to settle, the 
question is nonetheless legitimate. As most 19th-century central banks had international 
merchant bankers sitting in their boards, the agency problem highlighted by the NBB’s 
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foreign reserve management practices must not have been an isolated case. The need to by-
pass the dependence from merchant bankers’ informational networks might have encouraged 
the development of in-house expertise on foreign exchange markets towards the end of the 
century.60 
 
Conclusions 
Through a case study on 1850s Belgium, this chapter has looked at 19th-century foreign 
exchange reserve management from the perspective of current issues. Two main findings have 
emerged. 
On the one hand, a number of circumstances used to make financial risk associated with 
reserves particularly low in the past. At a time in which deposits were rather unpractical and 
bonds still fairly illiquid, bills of exchange proved the ideal instrument to combine liquidity 
and profitability targets. Basically no liquidity risk was associated with these securities, while 
credit risk was limited by the mutual guarantee system; as a result, only a small amount of 
market risk remained, mostly tied to exchange rate fluctuations – in turn, limited by the 
operation of credible fixed-exchange-rate regimes. 
On the other hand, operational risk associated with reserve management used to be 
potentially high: the structure of decision-making allowed for the presence of patent conflicts 
of interests, which exposed central banks to agency problems. This structure also engendered 
perverse incentives to increase foreign exchange activities because of the profit-seeking 
attitude of insiders colluding with correspondents. 
These findings highlight the big differences existing between then and now: nowadays, 
operational risk is limited by sophisticated reporting techniques, while financial risk is kept 
much higher by the current architecture of the international financial system. An assessment 
of the pros and cons of each system is far from straightforward. As far as we know, the 
apparent underestimation of operational risk by 19th-century central bankers does not seem to 
have generated major losses. On the contrary, the recent crisis seems to show that nowadays’ 
financial architecture has made all kinds of financial risks associated with reserve 
management (market, credit, and liquidity risk) conducive to potentially large losses for 
central banks. This calls for further reflections on the way foreign exchange reserve 
management should or should not evolve in the future. 
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Archival Sources 
Archives Générales du Royaume/Algemeen Rijksarchief (Brussels), Fonds Banque Nationale: 
- PV CdA: Procès-verbaux du Conseil d’Administration (Minutes of the Board of 
Directors), 1850-9. 
- IC: Indicateur de la correspondance du Gouverneur (Index of the Governor’s 
correspondance), 1851-3. 
Banque Nationale de Belgique/Nationale Bank van België (Brussels), Archives 
Centrales/Centraal Archief: 
- RAG: Rapports du Gouverneur à l’Assemblée Générale des actionnaires (Annual Reports 
to Shareholders), 1851-3; 1856. 
Bank of England Archive (London), Cashiers’ Department: 
- C28/11-3: Daily Discounts, 1851-3. 
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